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Introduction
Increasing public investment in education remains 
high on the political agenda of policymakers in Europe 
and beyond. For example, the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy 
of the European Union (EU) and the associated 
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‘Education and Training 2020’ programme have set 
ambitious goals, such as reducing dropouts from 
school to less than 10 percent of students and increas-
ing the share of young adults with a tertiary education 
degree to more than 40 percent.1 In many European 
countries, meeting these ambitious targets will require 
additional public (and potentially private) investment 
in education. At the same time, investing in education 
is believed to play a key role in dealing with the recent 
trend of increasing socioeconomic inequality associ-
ated with the rise of the globalized service-based 
knowledge economy (Busemeyer, 2015; Goldin and 
Katz, 2008; Huber and Stephens, 2014).
The political conditions for increasing the levels 
of education spending are not always propitious, 
however. On the one hand, many European coun-
tries are still suffering the aftershocks of the global 
economic and fiscal crisis, resulting in tight budget 
constraints. Discretionary types of spending such 
as social investment have been found to be more 
susceptible to retrenchment pressures during times 
of fiscal austerity compared to social entitlement 
programmes (Breunig and Busemeyer, 2012; 
Streeck and Mertens, 2011). Expanding spending 
in times of austerity therefore seems unlikely. 
On the other hand, policy proposals to expand 
educational opportunities can be considered the 
‘archetypical crowd-pleaser’ (Ansell, 2010: 136). 
In existing surveys of public opinion, proposals to 
increase public spending on education are sup-
ported by huge majorities in most Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries (Ansell, 2010: Chapter 4; Busemeyer, 
2015: Chapter 5; Garritzmann, 2015). Not surpris-
ingly, political parties do not disagree on whether 
to expand education but differ mostly with regard 
to the emphasis they place on this issue relative to 
others (Busemeyer et al., 2013).
Despite this high level of popular demand, in many 
countries, the actual spending levels have remained 
constant or even declined. In Germany, for example, 
public education spending has barely increased from 
4.9% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 to 
5.1% in 2011, despite a strong increase in student 
numbers. In France, spending actually fell from 6.4% 
to 6.1% during the same time period (OECD, 2014: 
231). So far, most of the explanations given for this 
apparent mismatch between public demands and 
policy output have focused on the latter. The reason 
that public spending on education is more constrained 
than other types of social spending could be because 
– as mentioned above – the political economy of 
budgetary decisions protects social entitlement pro-
grammes to the detriment of investment-oriented dis-
cretionary spending. Furthermore, there is mounting 
evidence that public spending, in general, is more 
constrained by the forces of economic globalization 
in the contemporary period compared to previous 
periods (Busemeyer, 2009; Jahn, 2006).
In this article, we want to focus on the input side 
of the political process, namely public opinion on 
education policy. Given the numerous shortcomings 
in existing surveys of public opinion, which we 
explain in detail below, the general understanding of 
the dynamic of public opinion on education is very 
limited. In particular, it is largely unknown whether 
citizens – when forced to make a choice – would 
indeed privilege education over other kinds of social 
spending. It could well be the case that citizens 
would rather tolerate underinvestment in education 
than cutbacks to popular social transfer programmes. 
Furthermore, very little is known about on which 
type of education citizens would like public invest-
ment to be concentrated. Providing a comprehensive 
answer to these questions is crucial in order to better 
understand why investing in education seems to be 
very popular on the level of political rhetoric but not 
necessarily on the level of policy output.
To provide answers, this article presents evidence 
from an original survey of public opinion on educa-
tion and other social policies, which was conducted 
in 2014 in eight Western European countries. We 
introduce and describe this survey in detail below. 
Furthermore, we concentrate on presenting largely 
descriptive statistics, as well as some interpretative 
and explorative analyses of the variation in public 
opinion on education policy across countries. More 
sophisticated statistical analyses of the determi-
nants of these attitudes are undertaken elsewhere 
(for example in Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2017). 
Thus, the contribution of this article is mainly empir-
ical, and it should be considered a first step towards 
the development of a more fine-grained and nuanced 
understanding of the micro-level and cross-country 
dynamics of public attitudes towards education 
policy.
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Nevertheless, the exploratory analysis in this arti-
cle yields some important findings. First, the evi-
dence confirms that education is very popular among 
European citizens, even when they are forced to 
choose between education and other social policies. 
We also find, however, that public opinion is divided 
on the question of which kind of education public 
expenditure should be concentrated on. In contrast to 
common assumptions in the literature, we find that 
citizens, on average, prefer to increase public spend-
ing on general (primary and lower secondary) 
schools and on vocational education rather than on 
early childhood and higher education, even though 
the latter two are usually central in political debates 
about the future of education and feature promi-
nently in the current ‘social investment’ literature 
(Bonoli, 2013; Esping-Andersen, 2002; Hemerijck, 
2013). Furthermore, our survey also indicates that 
citizens’ demands are not just ‘cheap talk’, since we 
find that the majority would accept non-trivial tax 
hikes in exchange for additional public investment in 
education.
Background: the current state of 
research into public opinion on 
education
The comparative analysis of public attitudes towards 
the welfare state (and other public policy) has 
become a major field of research in recent years 
(see Svallfors, 2012, for a recent overview) as a con-
sequence of the establishment of cross-national sur-
vey programmes, such as the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP), the European Social 
Survey (ESS), the Eurobarometer and the World/
European Value Survey (WVS/EVS). The first gen-
eration of comparative studies was often confined to 
the comparison of a limited number of individual 
country cases (for example Bean and Papadakis, 
1998; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Svallfors, 1997) 
and more concerned with identifying individual-
level determinants of welfare-state attitudes, such as 
income, education, age, gender and partisan ideol-
ogy. With the expanding number of countries cov-
ered in the cross-national survey programmes, the 
focus of analysis turned from individual-level fac-
tors towards exploring the feedback effects of 
macro-level welfare-state institutions on the micro-
level of preferences and attitudes (see, for example, 
Andreß and Heien, 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 
2003; Campbell, 2012; Finseraas, 2009; Gingrich 
and Ansell, 2012; Jaeger, 2006, 2009; Mettler and 
Soss, 2004; Svallfors, 1997, 2004, 2010, 2012). 
More recently, scholars have become interested in 
understanding the linkages between public opinion 
and actual policy output (Brooks and Manza, 2006, 
2007; Rehm, 2012; Rehm et al., 2012; Soroka and 
Wlezien, 2010). Recent work has also expanded 
our knowledge about additional determinants of 
individual-level support for the welfare state by 
highlighting the impact of factors, such as skill spec-
ificity (Iversen and Soskice, 2001), labour market 
risk (Rehm, 2009), perceptions of deservingness 
(Van Oorschot, 2006) and religion (De La O and 
Rodden, 2008; Scheve and Stasavage, 2006). Finally, 
scholars have begun to analyse the impact of 
the Great Recession on social-policy preferences 
(Margalit, 2013).
The bulk of existing scholarship in comparative 
welfare-state research is concerned with studying 
public attitudes towards more traditional social poli-
cies, such as healthcare, unemployment insurance 
and pensions, as well as public support for govern-
ment-induced redistribution more broadly defined. 
Scholars of education systems and education policy, 
in turn, do not study individual preferences on 
education policy for the most part, being more con-
cerned with the analysis of educational choices, 
attainment and educational inequality (see, for exam-
ple, Breen et al., 2009; Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). 
Consequently, there is very little research about 
public opinion on education policy, which is most 
probably related to two factors: first, the study of 
education policy has not featured prominently in 
comparative public policy and welfare-state research 
(Busemeyer, 2015; Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2011; 
Iversen and Stephens, 2008; Jakobi et al., 2010), and 
recent contributions in this field mostly focus on the 
aggregate level of policy output rather than public 
opinion. A second reason is the dearth of more fine-
grained public opinion data on education compared 
to other social policies (discussed in detail below).
Recently, however, there has been more scholarly 
interest in exploring public opinion on education 
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policy. As in contemporary welfare-state research, 
existing scholarship about public opinion on educa-
tion policy is often concerned with the analysis of 
institutional feedback effects. For example, Ansell 
(2010) and Busemeyer (2012) argued that the degree 
of stratification of educational institutions shapes 
patterns of public support: individuals in the upper 
income classes are more likely to support public 
investment in education if access to higher levels of 
education is limited. Busemeyer and Iversen (2014) 
added to this perspective by showing that high-
income individuals are more likely to support public 
rather than private provision of education in coun-
tries where the public component is already domi-
nant and opportunities to ‘opt out’ of public schemes 
are more limited. Garritzmann (2015) complemented 
these analyses by studying preferences for financial 
student aid using ISSP data for more than 20 coun-
tries over two decades. He showed that respondents’ 
education policy preferences are affected by materi-
alistic self-interest, their ideological positions and by 
positive feedback effects of the existing education 
systems. There is also some evidence that genera-
tional cleavages between the young and old are more 
important in the case of education than in other 
social policies (Busemeyer et al., 2009; Cattaneo and 
Wolter, 2009) – a finding that earlier studies support 
for the case of the United States (Button, 1992; 
Poterba, 1998). Busemeyer et al. (2011) demon-
strated for the case of Switzerland that individual 
educational experiences and partisan ideology have 
strong effects on public attitudes as well. Using a 
number of survey experiments, Lergetporer et al. 
(2016) studied how the provision of information 
influences public attitudes towards education policy 
(see also Wößmann et al., 2014).
Building on these studies, the aim of this article is 
to advance our understanding of the micro-level 
dynamics of public opinion on education policy. 
More specifically, we are interested in public opinion 
about public spending on different sectors of the edu-
cation system (from pre-primary to higher educa-
tion), how these preferences relate to spending 
preferences for other social policies and the extent to 
which preferences towards education spending cor-
respond with support for higher levels of taxation in 
that area. The article aims to contribute to the existing 
literature by offering a more fine-grained compara-
tive analysis of public opinion towards education 
policy.
Even though scholarly interest on the topic has 
increased significantly, further progress has been 
stymied somewhat by a number of shortcomings in 
existing surveys. One widely used dataset is the 
ISSP’s ‘Role of Government’ (RoG) module, which 
contains questions on individual support for the 
expansion of public spending on a variety of social 
policies, including education. The advantage of the 
ISSP survey is that it covers a large number of coun-
tries (33 in the latest wave, in 2006), which makes it 
possible to use multilevel regression analysis to 
study the moderating impact of socioeconomic con-
texts and political institutions on the micro-level 
dynamics. Another advantage of the ISSP data is that 
it allows for analyses of changes over time, at least 
for some countries, since there are four waves of the 
ISSP RoG module available between 1985 and 2006 
(a fifth wave will be available soon).
One significant downside of the ISSP survey, 
however, is that it does not distinguish between dif-
ferent sectors of the education system. Therefore, it 
does not contain information on individual attitudes 
for different kinds of education (academic, voca-
tional, general, etc.). Furthermore, although the 
wording of the specific question includes a brief note 
that increasing spending could lead to higher taxes, 
the trade-offs between different kinds of social poli-
cies are not modelled in a satisfactory way. Since 
respondents are not forced to make choices between 
different policies, the ISSP data blur the distinction 
between individual support for public spending in 
general and public spending on education more spe-
cifically. Finally, the wording of the question does 
not acknowledge differences in the status quo in dif-
ferent countries, because it only asks about increases 
or decreases in spending, not about the desired total 
amount.
A second potential data source is the ESS. This 
survey programme also provides data on a large num-
ber of European countries, so that it is possible to 
study how institutional contexts affect attitudes. 
However, the ESS does not contain any survey ques-
tions on individual education policy preferences in the 
core module, except a very general one on the ‘state of 
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education’. In one wave (2008–2009), the ESS actu-
ally included a specific module on ‘welfare state atti-
tudes’ (which is analysed in detail in Svallfors, 2012), 
but tellingly, this module does not include any ques-
tions on education. Other widely used datasets, such 
as the Eurobarometer and the World Values Survey, 
do not include any specific questions on education 
policy preferences either or only include weakly 
framed and very specific questions.
Survey design, methodology and 
data collection of the INVEDUC 
survey
Given these shortcomings, we conducted our own 
survey of public opinion in eight European countries: 
the INVEDUC survey (in the context of the project 
‘Investing in Education in Europe: Attitudes, Politics 
and Policies’). This survey covers Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. This selection of cases was motivated by 
the desire to have two cases for each ‘world of welfare 
capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990) or ‘world of 
human capital formation’ (Iversen and Stephens, 
2008) in Western Europe.2 The United Kingdom and 
Ireland represent the liberal welfare-state regime, 
Sweden and Denmark the social-democratic, and 
Germany and France the conservative. Southern 
European countries are sometimes considered to 
form a separate regime type (for example see Bonoli, 
1997; West and Nikolai, 2013 for the case of educa-
tion more specifically), so we also included Spain 
and Italy in our survey. A necessary limitation of our 
survey is that we are unable to make claims about the 
countries we could not include. It remains a task for 
future research to analyse public opinion towards edu-
cation policy in Eastern European and non-European 
countries and to compare the results to ours.
There are four major innovations in our survey in 
comparison with the often-used ISSP RoG module. 
First, in comparing preferences for education spend-
ing with support for other social policies, we include 
additional spending categories reflecting the changing 
character of contemporary welfare states: spending on 
the poor, on families and on active labour market pro-
grammes. This accounts for the increased public and 
scholarly attention (Bonoli, 2013; Hemerijck, 2013) 
paid to family policy and active labour market policy 
(ALMP), as well as the increasing relevance of the 
phenomenon of the ‘working poor’. Second, in addi-
tion to asking respondents about their support for edu-
cation spending in general, we use a more fine-grained 
scheme that allows us to identify relative preferences 
for different types of education: preschool education, 
general (primary and secondary) schooling, voca-
tional education and training (VET) and academic 
higher education. This is important and interesting, 
because it is by now well known that the redistributive 
dynamics (and consequently the politics) differ starkly 
across educational sectors. Higher education, for 
example, can have financially progressive or regres-
sive implications depending on the enrolment level 
(Ansell, 2010; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1995) and 
the characteristics of the respective funding system 
(Garritzmann, 2016). Third, in order to provide a bet-
ter understanding of how prominently education 
spending features in public opinion vis-à-vis other 
spending areas, respondents are also forced to identify 
only one particular spending area which they believe 
should be prioritized in order to avoid ‘cheap talk’ in 
their expression of spending preferences. This is done 
both in the comparison of education with other policy 
fields and in the comparison of preferences for differ-
ent types of education. Finally, our survey asks for the 
respondents’ willingness to accept additional taxes to 
finance investment increases in different education 
sectors and the amount they would each personally be 
willing to contribute. Taken together, these modifica-
tions address major shortcomings in international sur-
vey research.3
The fieldwork for the INVEDUC survey was 
conducted by a professional survey company spe-
cializing in cross-national surveys of public opinion. 
The chosen surveying technique was computer-
assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) – a method 
that has become dominant since the mid-1980s 
because it was deemed capable of achieving the 
same level of quality as face-to-face interviews at 
lower costs (Krosnick, 1999). The universe of our 
survey was adults (aged 18 and above) selected via 
random probability sampling. This sampling method 
ensures that every individual from a given popula-
tion, in our case from every country in the survey 
and from every social level within each country, has 
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an equal likelihood of being interviewed (Pennings 
et al., 2006). The sampling method is crucial in order 
to increase the degree of representativeness. An 
increasing percentage of the population use only 
mobile phones, so we included both landlines and 
‘mobile-only’ citizens in our sample (See Link et al., 
2007). Since mobile-only citizens are usually not 
included in telephone registers, we employed the 
common method of random digit dialling (RDD), in 
which mobile phone numbers are picked at random 
extrapolating from existing mobile numbers. The 
only exception is Sweden, since in this country, the 
existing address register covers about 90 percent of 
the population (for details, see the technical report to 
the INVEDUC survey: Gensicke et al., 2014).
The fieldwork for the survey was conducted 
between mid-April and the end of May 2014. During 
this period, a total of 8905 valid interviews were con-
ducted. The number of interviews in each country 
(see Table A3 in the online appendix) varied between 
1000 and 1500, reflecting differences in the size and 
socioeconomic composition of the respective popu-
lations. The average response rate was 27% (with a 
low of 20% in Ireland and a high of 36% in Denmark).4 
In general, these response rates are satisfactory and 
typical for these kinds of surveys, especially consid-
ering that survey research has been suffering from a 
general decline in response rates (Steeh, 1981; but 
see the critical discussion in Stoop et al., 2010) since 
the early 1980s. Furthermore, response rates are not 
necessarily related to biased samples. Investing 
significantly in the sampling process reduces the 
danger of bias. Furthermore, applying carefully con-
structed sampling weights can effectively address 
the remaining differences between responding and 
non-responding populations (Groves, 2006).
Both population and design weights are included 
in our descriptive analysis below. Design weights cor-
rect for different selection probabilities: by account-
ing for non-response bias (Groves, 2006), they make 
the sample more representative and closer to a ‘true’ 
sample of the population aged 18+. Population 
weights are used when more than one country is 
included in the analysis. These types of weights con-
trol for the differences in the socioeconomic composi-
tion of populations between countries. For example, 
as in most other social surveys, most countries 
included in our survey have similar sample sizes, even 
though their real population differs. The population 
weights control for these differences and make the 
necessary adjustments to ensure that each country is 
represented in the overall pool in proportion to its 
population size (for details, see the discussion in the 
background report on response rates and the weights: 
Gensicke et al., 2014: 17–23). As another robustness 
check, Table A1 in the online appendix compares the 
distribution of some key demographic variables in the 
INVEDUC survey with data from the ESS waves of 
2012 and 2014. This comparison shows that in gen-
eral, there is little discrepancy between our data and 
the ESS data (which is usually regarded as the gold 
standard in survey research). This adds to our confi-
dence about the representative nature of our sample.
Another challenge of cross-national surveys such 
as ours is that the survey is conducted in different 
countries with different languages. Interviews should 
ideally be conducted in the national language by 
native speakers of that language, since the expecta-
tion is that the quality of the collected data increases 
when the national language is used during the inter-
view. We implemented this standard in the present 
survey, working with a professional survey company 
that has offices and/or representatives in each of the 
countries included in the analysis.
We designed the questionnaire in English and then 
translated into each national language. Our goal for 
each national language was to generate a translation 
as close as possible to the original document while 
making sure that all questions had the same meaning 
and were understood across all languages. As with all 
other high-quality cross-national surveys in Europe, 
the methodology used for the translation process 
included five distinct steps: translatability check, 
translation, linguistic quality control (LQC), pretest 
and final quality control (Harkness et al., 2010). The 
master questionnaire was first submitted to a thor-
ough translatability assessment by our linguistic part-
ner, cApStAn, in which professionals specialized in 
each of the languages produced a draft translation of 
all items for each language. These translations helped 
to identify the issues the professional translators 
would face (for example cultural differences, unnec-
essary complexities, idiosyncrasies). The question-
naire was then translated by professional translators 
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using computer-aided translation (CAT) tools, which 
help to provide consistency and completeness during 
the translation process. In the subsequent phase of 
LQC, the ‘verifiers’, as they are usually called, made 
sure that the questionnaires were free from remaining 
grammar, punctuation and syntax errors. The final 
outcome of this stage was then evaluated by a senior 
linguistic expert in each respective language. A simi-
lar approach is used by the ESS. Detailed information 
on the various steps taken can be found in the back-
ground report (Gensicke et al., 2014: 5–10).
Our final step before the actual fieldwork was to 
test our questionnaire in a pretest survey. During 
the pretest period, researchers are able to identify 
questions that respondents have difficulty in under-
standing and other issues related to the design of 
the questionnaire. We conducted about 25 pretest 
interviews in each of the eight included countries. 
Following the pretest, a debriefing session was 
organized that provided an opportunity to discuss 
the interviewers’ experiences. A further objective 
of the pretest survey was to train the interviewers 
and identify potential problems in the implementa-
tion. The background report (Gensicke et al., 2014) 
discusses these and related issues in much more 
detail.
Empirical findings
The following section provides empirical findings 
from our INVEDUC survey. First, we present an 
overview on public opinion towards education spend-
ing relative to other social policies. Second, we focus 
on preferences regarding the distribution of spending 
across different educational sectors (early childhood 
education, general schooling, vocational education 
and academic higher education). Within these two 
broader topics, we first discuss the respondents’ pol-
icy preferences on spending when they were not 
forced to prioritize between different policies. In the 
second step, we look at attitudes when respondents 
were forced to name only one policy area (education 
against other social policies in the first case, different 
sectors of the education system in the second), in 
which spending should be increased. Finally, we look 
at respondents’ willingness to pay for different kinds 
of education in the form of higher taxes.
Public opinion on the importance of education 
spending relative to other social policies
The first question we used to measure public support 
for education spending relative to other social poli-
cies replicates the widely used question in the ISSP 
RoG module. The exact wording is
In the following, I will name several areas of 
government activity. Please tell me whether you would 
like to see more or less government spending in each 
area. Keep in mind that ‘more’ or ‘much more’ might 
require a tax increase.
One crucial difference from (and extension of) the 
ISSP version, however, is that we included additional 
policy fields that reflect new policy-making priorities 
in European welfare states. The policy fields men-
tioned in the survey are healthcare, unemployment 
benefits, old-age pensions, social assistance to the 
poor, financial support for families, education, labour 
market and public employment programmes, defence 
and environmental protection (the latter two are 
included to enable the comparison of support for 
social policies with support for non-welfare policies). 
The order of the respective answer categories was 
randomized for each respondent so that the sequenc-
ing would not affect answer patterns. Respondents’ 
preferences for government spending are captured on 
a five-point scale, where higher values indicate a pref-
erence for more spending (much less spending = 1, 
less = 2, the same = 3, more = 4 and much more = 5).
The first striking observation is that across all 
policy fields, the highest level of support is for 
increased spending on education. When aggregated 
across countries, a large majority of European citi-
zens (almost 80 percent) prefer higher levels of 
spending on education. From this perspective, and 
as has been shown in previous studies (Ansell, 
2010; Busemeyer et al., 2013), education can indeed 
be regarded as a valence issue (Green, 2007). Parties 
and voters, in general, tend to agree on the need for 
more spending and differ mainly in the emphasis 
they place on this topic (vis-à-vis other government 
activities).
Above and beyond education, Figure 1 displays 
the high levels of support for increased spending on 
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healthcare (67% of respondents demand higher 
spending, averaged across all countries), pensions 
(58%) and families (56%) but markedly less support 
for increased spending on unemployment benefits 
(30%) and defence (20%). ALMP is located in 
between these extremes, with 48% of the respond-
ents in favour of more spending. This is generally in 
line with the literature on ‘deservingness’ (Van 
Oorschot, 2006), which argues that the support for 
spending on welfare-state beneficiaries considered 
to be ‘deserving’ should be higher than the support 
for spending on the ‘undeserving’ (that is, the sick 
and disabled as opposed to the unemployed). Our 
data also, however, show that there is considerable 
support for spending on social assistance to the poor 
(59%). A final interesting observation is that spend-
ing on welfare-state policies is, in general, much 
more popular than spending on non-welfare state 
policies: 54% of the respondents favour spending 
increases for environmental protection, and only 
20% favour more spending on defence, while the 
average value of support for increased spending 
in the remaining seven categories is 56%. All of 
these differences are statistically significant against 
one another (the narrow confidence bands in the 
figure already indicate this – t-test and proportion 
tests are available on request).
Figure 1 depicts the variation in support for dif-
ferent types of public spending across all countries 
(using survey weights as discussed above). The bars 
present the sum of the shares of respondents demand-
ing ‘more’ or ‘much more’ spending in the respective 
categories. All in all, there is a high degree of con-
sistency in the relative importance of spending cate-
gories across countries, but there are also some 
significant differences. What is most important is 
that the country-by-country analysis confirms that 
across Europe, education is at the top of the public’s 
agenda. In all countries, with the exception of 
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, public 
Figure 1. Respondents’ preferences for different kinds of public expenditure across countries.
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support for increased spending on education is 
higher than that for all other policy areas. This pat-
tern is the most pronounced in Germany and could 
be cautiously interpreted as an indication of ‘nega-
tive feedback effects’ in the sense of Soroka and 
Wlezien (2010): citizens in countries with above-
average levels of spending (Sweden, Denmark) or 
with recent strong increases in spending (the United 
Kingdom) are less keen on further expanding spend-
ing, whereas the situation is the reverse in countries 
with below-average spending such as Germany.
Figure 1 shows interesting findings for the other 
social-policy areas as well. For instance, support for 
additional financial support for families is lowest in 
countries with family policies strongly supporting 
dual-earner families. This includes the Scandinavian 
countries of Sweden and Denmark but to a lesser 
extent France. At the other end of the scale, more 
financial support for families is highest in the famil-
ialistic Southern European welfare-state regimes 
(Spain and Italy) followed by the conservative 
German welfare state and Catholic Ireland. Again, 
this is in line with the notion of ‘negative feedback’.
With regard to preferences for labour market–
related spending, preferences partly reflect the coun-
try’s current economic situation, but there are also 
some more nuanced differences. Preferences for 
additional spending on unemployment benefits, the 
poor and ALMP are highest in Italy and Spain, most 
probably because the negative consequences of the 
economic and fiscal crisis are much more visible in 
these countries compared to Northern Europe. While 
citizens in the Scandinavian countries are likely to 
support spending for the poor, Swedish respondents 
are more in favour of spending increases on unem-
ployment benefits. Furthermore, citizens in the lib-
eral welfare state of the United Kingdom and in 
France are least supportive of spending on unem-
ployment benefits; the French prefer additional 
spending on ALMP instead. In Ireland, however, 
citizens express support for additional spending for 
the poor rather than for unemployment benefits. The 
low support for additional spending on unemploy-
ment in the United Kingdom and Ireland – despite 
the fact that these countries already spend below 
average in these policy fields – indicates that above 
and beyond negative feedback, different traditions of 
welfare-state policy also play a role here. A similar 
observation can be made in the case of healthcare, 
where support for additional spending is highest in 
countries with national healthcare systems (espe-
cially the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden). 
Taken together, these figures suggest that both eco-
nomic context and different welfare-state traditions 
are likely to shape public preferences in the different 
spending categories.
As discussed above, the major shortcoming of the 
question frame used so far is that it is ‘unconditional’, 
that is, respondents are asked about ‘benefits’ without 
simultaneously being reminded of potential ‘costs’ of 
increased public spending. We know, however, that 
support in these unconditional question frames is sig-
nificantly higher than when respondents are reminded 
about potential costs (Citrin, 1979; Welch, 1985). To 
avoid this problem and to investigate how important 
education expenditure is for respondents vis-à-vis 
other public expenditures, we next analyse answers 
towards the question about spending priorities. We 
asked respondents,
If the government could increase spending for only one 
area of its activity, which one of the following should it 
be in your opinion?
The list of policy fields from which respondents could 
choose is the same as in the previous question (and 
again the ordering of the answer categories was rand-
omized for each interview). The findings reveal that in 
the pooled sample, education is again mentioned the 
most (29%), followed by healthcare (22%), and 
ALMPs (15%). These averages, however, cover a high 
degree of variation across countries (Figure 2): educa-
tion and healthcare feature prominently everywhere, 
and this advantage over other social-policy areas 
becomes more pronounced when moving from the 
unconstrained framing to the constrained one. In the 
majority of countries (Sweden, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland), a relative majority of 
respondents support additional spending on healthcare 
if forced to make a choice. This finding implies that the 
results for the pooled sample are driven by Germany 
and Italy (which receive a higher weight in the calcula-
tion of the overall average because of their larger popu-
lations). In Germany and Italy, education is the area that 
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receives the highest level of support, whereas French 
respondents put the highest priority on spending 
increases for labour market and public employment 
programmes. This spending area also features promi-
nently in Italy and Spain, a result that is obviously 
related to the economic situation in these countries.5 
There is also important variation with regard to finan-
cial support for families. Nearly a fifth of German 
respondents (19%) state this item as their priority for 
spending increases but hardly anyone sees this as a pri-
ority in Sweden (3%), Denmark (5%) or France (5%).
These findings can be regarded as an important 
complement to the previous ones. For one, forcing 
respondents to choose between different policy 
areas shows that education features very promi-
nently on the public’s agenda. Nonetheless, health-
care is regarded as even more pressing in a majority 
of countries. Furthermore, support for healthcare 
is again very strong in countries with national 
healthcare systems, but it remains unclear whether 
citizens’ support for additional spending is high in 
these countries because the existing institutional 
arrangements are so popular or because citizens 
demand that the government invest more to compen-
sate for deficits. The popularity of healthcare could 
also be due to the simple fact that the size of the 
potential constituency for healthcare (everyone gets 
ill at some point) is larger than that for education 
(Jensen, 2014). But education continues to receive 
strong support in countries with a significant degree 
of underinvestment, such as Germany and Italy.
Public opinion on the distribution of 
spending across different education 
sectors
In addition to asking respondents about their opinion 
on education spending relative to other social 
Figure 2. Respondents’ preferences for different kinds of public expenditure, when forced to choose one and only 
one spending area.
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policies, our survey also contains questions to gauge 
public attitudes on the distribution of investments 
across different educational sectors. So far, no inter-
national comparative survey has provided this kind 
of information (but see Busemeyer et al., 2011 for 
the case of Switzerland and Wößmann et al., 2014 
for Germany). We confronted respondents with two 
questions:
Let’s talk about the distribution of public spending in 
the education sector. Please tell me whether you would 
like to see more or less government spending in each of 
the following areas. Keep in mind that ‘more’ or ‘much 
more’ might require a tax increase.
Respondents were offered four answer categories: 
‘Pre-school and early childhood education’,6 ‘gen-
eral school education’, ‘vocational education and 
training’ and ‘universities and other higher educa-
tion’. Of course, we could have differentiated further 
between even more fine-grained categories (primary 
as opposed to secondary education, preschool vs. 
early childhood education and care, and so on), but 
we believe that these four categories cover the major 
areas well while keeping the question framing as 
simple as possible and comparable across countries 
(the more complex the questions, the more likely it is 
that less-informed citizens will refuse to answer or 
will check boxes at random, as is well known in sur-
vey research). For each of the four education sectors, 
respondents were again asked whether they would 
like to ‘spend much more’, ‘spend more’, ‘spend the 
same as now’, ‘spend less’, ‘spend much less’ or 
whether they ‘don’t know’.
A first interesting finding is that there is a consid-
erable degree of variation in support for spending 
increases across the educational sectors (see the first 
panel in the upper left corner of Figure 3): if we 
aggregate across the different countries, support is 
highest for spending on general school education and 
on VET. For each of these two sectors, 62% of the 
Figure 3. Respondents’ preferences for spending on different sectors of the education system across countries.
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respondents are in favour of spending increases. 
In contrast, support is significantly lower in the case 
of higher education and early childhood education.7 
This is a notable finding, because it is usually the lat-
ter two that are emphasized in public debates about 
the expansion of education: as mentioned in the 
introduction, EU policies specifically aim to increase 
enrolment in tertiary education, but this apparently 
does not reflect the priorities of the European public, 
since spending increases on higher education are 
supported by only slightly more than half of the 
respondents (53%). Equally surprisingly, additional 
spending on early childhood education is not as pop-
ular as could be expected, even though it is a central 
component of the social-investment model of the 
welfare state (Bonoli, 2013; Esping-Andersen, 2002; 
Hemerijck, 2013). The reason why spending on gen-
eral and vocational education is so popular might be 
that it is relevant for a larger share of the population 
(general education) or that people value the connec-
tion between education and the labour market (voca-
tional education).
Furthermore, the average levels of support for 
this question are considerably lower than for the 
general question about education spending discussed 
above. As we have already stated, increased spend-
ing on education is supported by nearly 80 percent of 
respondents across the whole sample. In contrast, 
the share of supporters for more spending, averaged 
over the four sectors, is only 57%. Respondents 
are more likely to express their support when asked 
about education spending on a general, rather 
abstract level than when they are reminded of the 
specific educational sectors to which the spending 
should go. This indicates that respondents have very 
different parts of the education system in mind when 
they are asked about ‘education spending in general’ 
(in surveys such as the ISSP), making it difficult to 
interpret these more general questions substantively. 
In Tables A4–A7 in the online appendix, we analyse 
this relationship further by cross-tabulating respond-
ents’ answers to the more general question on educa-
tion spending against their preferences towards 
spending on the specific education sectors. In brief, 
this exercise seems to confirm the hunch that 
respondents to the unconstrained question have gen-
eral schooling and vocational education in mind 
rather than early childhood and higher education.
As before, there are some notable differences 
across countries (see Figure 3), although the general 
pattern from the pooled sample holds across most of 
the cases.8 The comparison between VET and higher 
education, in particular, is revealing, as these present 
two alternative educational streams after compul-
sory secondary education. In all countries (except 
Germany), there is more public support for increased 
spending on VET than for higher education. Other 
than in Germany, the support for increased spending 
on VET is lowest in the liberal countries, but even in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, the average value 
of the spending support for VET is higher than the 
value for early childhood education and higher edu-
cation. Support for spending increases in VET is 
highest in the Southern European countries con-
fronted with extremely high levels of youth unem-
ployment.9 This pattern confirms the impression that 
VET is highly regarded for its contribution to 
smoothing the transition from education to employ-
ment, and it is particularly in those countries where 
educational pathways in VET are weakly developed 
that citizens demand more public investment. 
However, the relatively low levels of support for 
VET in the United Kingdom and Ireland also indi-
cate the latent impact of welfare-state and education-
policy traditions.
In the case of early childhood education, the pat-
terns of public opinion are harder to make sense of. 
Demand is highest in Sweden, Germany and Spain 
(about 60 percent each). Sweden already has a 
well-established system of early childhood educa-
tion, whereas the latter two are latecomers, although 
Germany has expanded the provision of childcare 
recently (Morgan, 2012). Preferences for more 
public spending might thus arise from the need for 
better availability of childcare services, and sup-
port may be further strengthened once a public sys-
tem of service provision has been established and 
private services are crowded out (Busemeyer and 
Iversen, 2014; Hedegaard and Larsen, 2014). 
Support for increased spending on childcare is low-
est in the United Kingdom and France. France 
spends a relatively high share of its GDP on early 
childhood education, and the United Kingdom 
has expanded spending in this area significantly 
in recent years. Since the 1980s, however, the 
government spending in France has increasingly 
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concentrated on subsidizing family day care rather 
than expanding spending on public day care centres 
(Morgan, 2005). As a consequence, a growing 
proportion of children attend this form of care that 
is characterized by a less-qualified workforce 
(Morgan, 2005). In the United Kingdom, the expan-
sion of childcare coverage that was initiated in the 
late 1990s by the New Labour government depends 
highly on provision by private providers. The 
expansion of childcare services was accompanied 
by increasing needs-testing and conditionality for 
receiving unemployment benefits (Fleckenstein 
et al., 2011). Following Thatcher’s dismantling of 
the unemployment insurance system in the 1980s, 
subsequent governments increased their focus on 
activation and benefit conditionality and aimed at 
integrating all working-age benefit claimants, 
including single parents, into the labour market 
(Clasen, 2011). Such contextual factors might trig-
ger opposition to further spending increases in 
these two countries. All in all, the variation of pub-
lic opinion across countries does not reveal a clear 
pattern of positive or negative feedback. At this 
point, we can only speculate which idiosyncratic 
factors might have influenced public opinion one 
way or another. Further research – for instance, 
case studies of concrete reform processes – would 
be needed to clarify these associations more.
Another remarkable finding is the high level of 
support in all countries for spending increases on 
general schooling, although a study on the case of 
Switzerland reports a similar finding (Busemeyer 
et al., 2011). A simple potential explanation for this 
observation is that in comparison to the other educa-
tional sectors, general schooling (primary and sec-
ondary education) is relevant for a larger group of 
people. Respondents might also believe that invest-
ment in basic education is more important than 
investment in post-secondary education or early 
childhood education.
In the next set of questions, we once again forced 
respondents to name just one educational sector in 
which to concentrate additional investment (Figure 4):
If the government could increase spending for one part 
of the education system only, which part should the 
government choose, in your opinion?
Here, respondents had to choose only one of the four 
education sectors. Again, we randomized the order 
of the answer categories offered.
On average, general schooling is the category 
chosen by most (39%), followed by VET (30%). In 
contrast, higher education (17%) and preschool and 
early childhood education (15%) are mentioned to a 
much lower degree (see the first panel in the upper 
left corner of Figure 4). Again, however, there are 
large differences between countries.10 General 
school education is the most chosen category in 
most countries (although neither in Denmark nor in 
France) but the level of support varies greatly. In 
Denmark and France – and to a lesser degree in 
Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom – the public 
deems additional spending on VET to be much more 
important. In turn, pre-primary education is named 
the top priority in Germany, the United Kingdom 
and Ireland compared to the other countries. Finally, 
higher education is prioritized in Italy and Spain.
In short, while we find the highest average 
demand for expenditure on general school education 
and VET, there is a lot of country variations, as the 
populations in the eight surveyed countries seem to 
have different demands concerning where and how 
additional education spending is needed. These 
mixed results might also be related to conflicting 
preferences among citizens: on one hand, they might 
be in favour of investing in those education sectors 
that are as yet only weakly developed and, as such, 
show promise in helping to solve societal problems 
(for example VET in Southern Europe). On the other 
hand, citizens who are sceptical as to whether gov-
ernments would be willing and able to implement 
these demands might therefore express support for 
additional spending on sectors that are already more 
institutionally developed (for example higher edu-
cation in Southern Europe). Trust in government 
might be an important mediating factor in citizens’ 
preferences for different policies, particularly in 
constrained scenarios.
Willingness to pay for additional spending 
on education
A third (hitherto neglected) dimension of public opin-
ion towards investment in education is individuals’ 
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willingness to pay for additional spending, that is, 
how much extra money citizens are willing to pay in 
order to finance educational expansion. In the 
INVEDUC survey, this is measured by a battery of 
questions in which respondents are confronted with a 
specific scenario:
Imagine the government proposes a new tax to finance 
additional investments in the following parts of the 
education system I will read out to you. Would you 
support a new tax to finance additional investments in 
the area of pre-school and early childhood education, 
general school education, vocational education and 
training, universities and other higher education?
Respondents were asked about their support for a 
new tax for each educational sector separately, that is, 
they could express their willingness to pay for VET 
but not for higher education, and so on. The findings 
reveal that public demands for additional education 
spending (particularly on general school education 
and on VET) are not just ‘cheap talk’: averaged 
across countries, the percentage of respondents will-
ing to accept a new tax is indeed rather high for all 
sectors (compare the first panel in upper left corner of 
Figure 5). The distribution of support for additional 
taxes to finance additional investment in education 
confirms our previous analyses. Respondents were, 
on average, more willing to support a new tax to 
finance investments in general schooling (57% of 
respondents) and VET (54%) than in higher educa-
tion and early childhood education. Willingness to 
accept additional taxes to finance higher education 
is lowest, with only 38% of respondents in favour 
of such a policy proposal, while the respective share 
of respondents favouring early childhood education 
is 43%.
Averaged across categories, the results further-
more reveal that the support for additional taxes to 
Figure 4. Respondents’ preferences for spending on different sectors of the education system, when forced to 
choose one and only one spending area.
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finance education spending is nearly as high as the 
support for unconditional spending. As a reminder, 
in the previous question on spending, 57% of the 
respondents were in favour of spending increases 
in at least one area of education spending. The 
question on taxes shows that 48% expressed a will-
ingness to accept higher taxes to finance additional 
spending in at least one area of education spend-
ing. Again, t-tests confirm that all percentages are 
significantly different from each other. This is a 
novel and surprising finding, as previous studies 
only included ‘unconditional’ questions and did 
not ask respondents for their preferences on the 
‘cost side’ of public education spending. It is also 
interesting to note that whereas about 22% of the 
respondents did not support a new tax for any of 
the four educational categories, 17% chose just 
one category, and another 17% supported new 
taxes to finance additional investment in all four 
categories. This indicates a rather complex and 
nuanced pattern in public opinion on education-
related tax increases.
When looking at country differences (Figure 5), 
we find a striking pattern: in some countries, support 
for additional taxes to finance education spending is 
nearly as high as support for unconditional spending, 
while there is a major decrease in support in other 
country cases.11 In Sweden, the difference in the per-
centage of people expressing strong demands for 
additional spending and the share of respondents 
willing to pay for this is smallest: on average, 61% 
of Swedish respondents accept additional taxes for at 
least one area of education spending. Italy, Germany 
and France are located at the other end of the scale: 
Italian respondents reveal the strongest discrepancy 
between spending preferences on one hand and will-
ingness to accept the corresponding taxes on the 
other. Whereas 64% demand more spending, only 
39% are willing to pay for this via additional taxes. 
There is no educational sector in which we find a 
Figure 5. Percentages of respondents willing to pay additional tax for investment in education across countries.
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relative majority that would be willing to pay higher 
taxes. Germany is similar in that respect, with 60% 
demanding more spending but only 44% of respond-
ents willing to pay for this via taxes. France is the 
country with the lowest absolute percentage of 
respondents in favour of tax increases. Here, only 
37% of the respondents state their willingness to 
accept additional taxes for spending increases in at 
least one area of education spending. However, 
in France, a majority still favour additional taxes 
to finance more spending on VET, with 58% of 
respondents expressing support. Taken together, our 
results indicate that citizens are not only demanding 
more spending but also in some cases they are also 
willing to pay for this via higher taxes. This implies 
that despite budget pressures in times of austerity 
and globalized economies, citizens are still willing 
to contribute financially to additional expenditures, 
at least in some countries and in some areas of public 
spending.
In addition to asking citizens for their general 
willingness to pay for additional education spending, 
we asked them about the specific amount (as a share 
of net income) respondents would be willing to 
spend. If a respondent replied positively to the previ-
ous question, s/he was then asked,
And what percentage of your personal net income 
would you be willing to pay for these investments in 
[EDUCATION LEVEL]? Please give a number between 
0 and 10 per cent.
This question is particularly important because peo-
ple might support taxes simply because they assume 
that they personally are not going to be taxed. Indeed, 
we find that a number of respondents state that they 
do not want to pay any additional taxes themselves. 
This share is rather low, however (6%). Even if we 
add those respondents who want to pay less than 
one percent, the majority of the respondents who 
support additional taxes are also willing to contrib-
ute a significant share of their income themselves. 
The averages for each of the sectors are quite close 
to each other, that is, around 4.1% (with a standard 
deviation of 2.8).
Figure 6 displays the average share of income 
citizens are willing to sacrifice in order to increase 
investment in education. This includes only those 
respondents who stated their willingness to accept a 
tax for all of the four areas of education spending in 
the question mentioned above. The results indicate 
that in most countries, there are no stark differences 
across educational sectors with regard to the share of 
net income that respondents are willing to give up 
for education. In Germany and Italy, for instance, 
there are hardly any differences in the amount of 
money citizens are willing to invest across different 
educational levels. Accordingly, t-tests reveal that 
the differences between the shares are mostly not 
significant at conventional levels (detailed results on 
request).
What is more important, however, is that we 
again observe significant differences across coun-
tries. Citizens in some countries are willing to invest 
much more than those in other countries: in Italy and 
Spain, citizens are willing to give up more than 
four percent of their income to finance additional 
spending on education, while in Ireland citizens are 
willing to pay less than two percent on average. 
These figures should not be interpreted in a literal 
sense but as a rough proxy measure of the intensity 
of respondents’ willingness to pay, complementing 
the previous measure from above. An increase in the 
income tax by four percentage points would be con-
siderable, especially when compared to the fact that 
education spending represents only a minor compo-
nent of the public budget (for example in no country 
does public spending on early childcare exceed two 
percent of GDP). Nevertheless, the differences across 
countries and categories provide valuable informa-
tion for comparisons and can be interpreted as a gen-
eral indicator of citizens’ willingness to back up their 
demands for more spending with higher taxes.
Discussion and conclusion
This article is a first step towards increasing our 
knowledge of the demand side of the politics of edu-
cation. We present initial findings from an original 
survey of public opinion on education and related 
policies, conducted in eight European countries: the 
INVEDUC survey. The purpose of this article has 
been empirical and descriptive, that is, to introduce 
and explore the INVEDUC survey, which has several 
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advantages compared to existing survey data: it 
forces people to prioritize between spending areas 
instead of simply asking about their support for 
spending, presents detailed data on spending prefer-
ences across different sectors of the education system 
and provides a measure of individuals’ willingness to 
pay for additional investment in education through 
higher taxes. A necessary disadvantage of our survey 
is that funding constraints only allowed for coverage 
of eight selected Western European countries. Thus, 
it remains a task for future research to extend the 
analysis to a broader set of countries.
Our findings confirm earlier analyses that found a 
high level of support for education spending (Ansell, 
2010; Busemeyer, 2015; Busemeyer et al., 2009, 
2011; Garritzmann, 2015, 2016). Our analysis sug-
gests that this support even holds when citizens are 
forced to choose between increased levels of spend-
ing on education and increased levels of other areas 
of social spending. Only healthcare is equally 
popular (in some countries). Support for education 
spending becomes less universal once education is 
disaggregated into its different sectors ranging from 
early childcare to higher education. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the popular demand for spending increases 
is strongest for general schooling and VET. This 
support for additional spending on VET is higher 
than the demand for increased higher education 
expenditure in the majority of countries, which is at 
odds with public debates focusing on the expansion 
of tertiary enrolment. Our data also show that a large 
percentage of the electorate is willing to pay for 
additional investment in education (at least in gen-
eral schooling and VET) via higher taxes. Against a 
dominant discourse about the unsustainability of 
public budgets in times of austerity, it appears that 
citizens are in fact willing to back up their demands 
for more spending with higher taxes, at least in some 
countries and for investment in some types of educa-
tion. We also engaged in some interpretative and 
Figure 6. Average share of net income that citizens are willing to pay for additional spending on education.
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explorative analysis of cross-country differences in 
attitudes. For the most part, we found significant 
indications for the existence of negative feedback 
effects in the sense of Soroka and Wlezien (2010), 
that is, citizens supporting policies that are different 
from the status quo. In other instances, however, the 
patterns suggested a latent influence of welfare-state 
traditions: in these cases, citizens’ attitudes are 
largely congruent with the prevailing status quo.
A range of research questions emerge from these 
findings. First, it is of central interest to evaluate the 
extent to which public attitudes towards education are 
relevant for the politics of education. In other words, 
what do (governing) political parties know about citi-
zens’ preferences in policy making, and how much of 
this do such parties take into account? Are policymak-
ers responsive to public demands? If so, from which 
group (the general public, partisan constituencies or 
special-interest groups)? Furthermore, the main pur-
pose of this article was to offer a detailed descriptive 
overview of public opinion on different types of edu-
cation policy. We have not yet studied the individual 
and macro-level determinants of public preferences. 
One obvious way forward is thus to evaluate which 
micro-level determinants account for these differ-
ences in attitudes, and how different country contexts 
(institutions) shape the dynamics of preference forma-
tion across countries. Drawing on earlier studies in 
this field (Ansell, 2010; Busemeyer et al., 2009, 2011; 
Busemeyer and Iversen, 2014; Garritzmann, 2015), 
we would expect that a combination of material self-
interest and political attitudes (such as ideological ori-
entation, redistribution preferences, and so on) affects 
people’s policy preferences for education (compare 
also Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2017). Finally, 
moving beyond the focus on spending in this article, 
the INVEDUC survey also provides a mechanism to 
analyse public preferences for other topics in educa-
tion policy, such as trade-offs between education and 
other social policies, as well as preferences for issues 
such as parental choice, marketization and the decen-
tralization of education. Moreover, studying the rela-
tionship between public opinion on public and on 
private education spending seems highly promising 
(compare Ansell, 2010; Busemeyer, 2015; Busemeyer 
and Iversen, 2014; Garritzmann, 2015, 2016), because 
scholarly knowledge on the public–private division of 
labour in the financing and provision of welfare-state 
services is still limited.
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Notes
 1. http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/strategic-frame 
work/index_en.htm
 2. Unfortunately, resource constraints did not permit 
the inclusion of Eastern European and non-European 
countries. It would obviously have been preferable to 
have more than two cases per regime type, but given 
the funding constraints, we wanted to have at least 
two for each regime in order to avoid the potential 
idiosyncratic biases of selecting only one case for 
each.
 3. Above and beyond the evidence presented in this arti-
cle, the survey also contains further questions related 
to trade-offs in social policy preferences, support 
for marketization, decentralization, choice reforms, 
childcare policies, tuition fees and so on. Given space 
limitations, this survey material will be analysed in 
subsequent work.
 4. In the survey methodological literature, there is a 
broader discussion on the definition and comparabil-
ity of response rates. Our response rates are defined 
as ‘100 – unknown eligibility (for example line busy, 
no answer) – refusals or break-offs – non-contact 
(respondent not available)’. As can be seen in the 
background report (Gensicke et al., 2014: 19, Table 
6) the ‘refusal’ rate is actually not very high, that is, 
between 30 percent and 40 percent.
 5. Because of space limitations, we focus on the major 
descriptive findings here. Nonetheless, interested 
readers can find additional information on this rela-
tionship in several cross-tabulations in the online 
appendix (Tables A8–A10.).
 6. To avoid ambiguity, the following definition was 
given to respondents: ‘Early childhood education 
refers to the early childhood educational development 
for children between 0 and 2 years and pre-school 
education from the age of 3 to the start of primary 
education’.
52 Journal of European Social Policy 28(1)
 7. T-tests show that the differences between the per-
centages for preschool and higher education are not 
significant, nor are the differences between general 
schooling and VET. The other differences, however, 
are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
 8. Again, all of these differences are statistically signifi-
cant at a 95% level; the few exceptions are pre-primary 
and higher education in the United Kingdom; general 
schooling and VET in the United Kingdom and Ireland; 
general schooling and higher education in Italy, Spain 
and France; and VET and higher education in Spain.
 9. See cross-tabulations in Tables A9 and A10 in the 
online appendix.
10. Similar to above, all of these are significant with a 
few exceptions: pre-primary and higher education in 
Denmark; general schooling and VET in Italy, Spain 
and Denmark; general schooling and higher educa-
tion in Spain (but significant at a 6% level); and VET 
and higher education in Spain.
11. All of these shares are significantly different, with the 
exception of general schooling and VET in Italy and 
Spain (significant in both on a 15% level) and general 
schooling and higher education in Spain and France 
(significant in both on 15% level).
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